By Sayed Mohammad Shah
Democracy functions in its own ways in different contexts and the recent political developments in Afghanistan, particularly the election of Speaker of House in Afghanistan Parliament very much showed the reality of this in the Afghan context. In the in election of speaker at least, the newly elected parliamentarians seem to have been acting driven by ethnic biases, in the sense that parliamentarians of one ethnic group would not vote for the candidate of other ethnic groups and some would even cast blank votes rather than support them. None of the ethnic blocs were in a position to elect their desired candidate without political deals with other ethnicities this resulted in a stalemate that lasted for a few weeks.
Democracy functions in its own ways in different contexts and the recent political developments in Afghanistan, particularly the election of Speaker of House in Afghanistan Parliament very much showed the reality of this in the Afghan context. In the in election of speaker at least, the newly elected parliamentarians seem to have been acting driven by ethnic biases, in the sense that parliamentarians of one ethnic group would not vote for the candidate of other ethnic groups and some would even cast blank votes rather than support them. None of the ethnic blocs were in a position to elect their desired candidate without political deals with other ethnicities this resulted in a stalemate that lasted for a few weeks.
The stalemate not only disappointed the people of Afghanistan but also brought into question the future role and ability of the parliament to make the best decisions in the national interest, this negative impression has only been exacerbated by the prevailing impressions of electoral fraud. The majority of parliamentarians, some of whom were key warlords in their time, manifested a blatent tribal mindset in the process of electing the head of a democratic institution and stayed strictly loyal to their ethnic interests. This behavior with regard to a key national decision also showed an absence of decision-making based on merit and the broader national interest However, the way stalemate ended and the election of a speaker occurred, surprised many but also revealed a gleam of hope for the future of democracy in Afghanistan and provided a brilliant instance demonstrating thinking beyond ethnic and political affiliations for the national interest.
This miracle happened when the majority of parliamentarians, as a result of the efforts of a commission established in the parliament to resolve the stalemate, agreed in consensus to elect the speaker of the house from a minority ethnicity—an Uzbek—and ignore the candidates of the three other larger ethnicities: Pashtuns, Hazaras and Tajiks. Although Uzbeks have only 19 seats in the house of 249, these 19 parliamentarians in a meeting amongst themselves decided unanimously on Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi as their candidate, he subsequently received 173 votes,[1] making him the Speaker of Afghan Parliament for a period of five years.
This was a victory for democracy over warlordism in Afghanistan, some famous warlords like Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf and Younas Qanooni were themselves candidates and others attempting to play the role of kingmakers such as Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq, could not attain the necessary fifty percent plus one vote to win. We can in addition say that Afghanistan’s juvenile democracy has set an example along with the mature democracies of United States and India where a black President and a Sikh Prime Minister are runnning the affairs of states.
However, this one incident does not imply that democracy has been institutionalized in Afghanistan. The earlier events in the process of elections for the parliament not only undermined democracy but also weakened the process of its institutionalization. The elections for the current parliament took place in a time when there was popular demand and pressure both from the international community and some political parties, for reforms to the Independent Election Commission (IEC) due to the fraudulent presidential election in 2009. When the time came minor changes were made in the organization and implementation of the polls, by replacing the Election Commission’s leadership and firing 6,000 field staff. Sufficient attention was not given to combating potential fraud and the consequent space available for political bargaining. Subsequently, clear evidence of fraud and manipulation of the electoral process reinforced the perception that the election had been tainted by the undue influence of both regional and national level political elites[2].
The announcement of preliminary results for the elections sparked protest demonstrations by some candidates because of allegations of fraud in the electoral process, this led to disqualification of 23 winners in the final results. The disqualifications fueled further protests that finally delayed parliament’s inauguration and the establishment of an entirely new entity, a ‘special court’. This was set up by President Karzai on 26 December 2010 to respond to the accusations of widespread fraud. A recent Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) paper[3] on the parliamentary elections of 2010 in Afghanistan said the special court was “widely speculated to be an attempt to rebalance the ethnic composition of the lower house.” The special court was rejected by electoral authorities as illegitimate since it had no clear connection to either the Independent Election Commission (IEC) or to the Election Complaint Commission (ECC). The month long delay in the inauguration of parliament finally broke after a compromise between the majority of MPs and the Presidential Palace, on the condition that the authority of the special court be recognized.
President Karzai inaugurated parliament on 25 January 2011 but in his speech he blamed foreigners for their interference which had sullied the results. These unpleasant events around the process of forming a new parliament, increased the distance between citizens and state instead of legitimizing representative governance in Afghanistan. The influence of political power-holders able to use elections as a rubber-stamp for their continued political control, ambiguity of the processes and roles of institutions, interference by internal and external actors in the election results, instability and insecurity, all contributed in forming the perceptions of the Afghan public that the right to have a say in the make-up of government was not in their hands[4].
In addition, it has cast a shadow on the perceptions of Afghans about democracy and democratization in Afghanistan, which were already contentious terms because of poor understanding and lack of accurate definition of these terms by many Afghans. Another AREU study by Anna Larson in 2009[5] explored the perceptions of Afghans regarding democratization in Afghanistan, it found that in the current context people defined democracy as unlimited social freedom, linking it to the information they have about democratic political systems with western and liberal values and that “it has taken on pejorative connotations that have been emphasized by the increasingly prevalent anti-western discourse heard in the public sphere.” That study concluded that “if liberal values continue to be considered imposed in Afghanistan, the result may be widespread disownership of the democratic process entirely, as a reaction against a perceived Western cultural invasion.” Similarly, there is disillusionment with the benefits that democracy can bring, due to an expected but, as yet unrealized, improvement in rule of law and economic development, combined with a hopelessness brought about by deteriorating security.[6]
Another key aspect of democratization of Afghanistan is linked with achieving the dream of a democratic society in the country: an effective state, free market and civil society. The later was a new term after the Taliban era and is now recognized as “jamia-i madani”, a direct translation of “civil society” in Dari. Unfortunately, an agreed definition of civil society does not yet exist in Afghanistan, however the wider understanding of it is non-profit, non-governmental, non-military and non-political organizations that work for the welfare of people and promotion of values of co-existence.[7] Elizabeth Winter, in her recent report on civil society in Afghanistan writes that “the ideal society is one in which there are an effective state, market and civil society but even when the first two of these three pillars are not present, it is still possible for individuals and groups to act for the common good without being either part of the state apparatus or in paid positions.” [8]
In Afghanistan, some civil society activists have reservations about the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as civil society organizations, mainly because of their activities in service delivery funded by donors, while the majority of other civil society actors believe that even service delivery by NGOs is for the welfare of people and NGOs do not gain profit from this for themselves Similarly, the recognition of media organizations is problematic they operate on commercial grounds even if at times they do advocate on behalf of the people against the government. In Afghanistan, the majority of media organizations are politically mandated and owned or influenced strongly by key warlords and political elites, in order to influence the public to accept vested interests.
The ambiguity of both the roles and mandates of different kinds of organizations in Afghan civil society negatively affects their performance and results in fragmentation and piecemeal activity. Afghanistan has seven networks of civil society organizations including: the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF), Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau (ANCB), Afghan Women Network (AWN), Civil Society and Development Centre (CSDC), Civil Society and Human Rights Network (CSHRN) and South West Afghanistan Balochistan Association for Coordination (SWABAC). Each of the networks has different members, in total around seven hundred members in Kabul and the provinces. However, on different occasions, these networks appear disorganized and not unified in their approach to dealing with similar issues.
The fragmentation is not only due to the ambiguity of roles and mandates but also due to the politics of ethnicity that is deeply rooted in civil society organizations. In many cases, different actors of civil society organizations were found reluctant to lobby or advocate in favour of a change that would not end fruitful in political interest of any specific ethnicity or it would spoil their allegiance with key political elites.[9]
Donors have also been influencing the plans and activities of civil society networks and organizations. There has been discontent about this role A general perception prevails that donors follow their own, often global, agendas rather than those important to Afghan civil society and are using their funds to push these, the donors often influence and alter the plans and activities of civil society organization.[10] Some renowned[11] activists in civil society believe that donors interact with civil society treating them as part of a project or programme rather than as an on-going and enduring process. These people suggest that donors should use their funding with a long term commitment to catalyse indigenous development in real partnership with local actors and allow civil society organizations to work on their own priority issues rather than funding specific projects that suit the donors.
In addition, the relation between government and civil society in Afghanistan is obscured by misunderstandings with each considering the other as an opponent rather than a partner. Civil society finds it in its mandate to monitor the laws, policies, programmes and implementation processes of the government system, and to give their positive comments as well as carry out advocacy to change things for the better, however the government sees this as an obstacle and interference in their affairs. Similarly, government of Afghanistan is struggling to get increased amount of development funds channeled through the national budget, while many civil society organizations are key implementing partners of the donors and spend large amounts of funds on development activities, this generates a potentially serious conflict of interest. This is why some of civil society experts[12] suggest that government endeavours are to keep civil society fragmented in its own interest.
However, this does not mean that fragmentation, donor-driven programmes and an unfriendly government environment did not allow civil society to make any progress at all. Civil society has set some milestones through advocacy, lobbying and awareness raising activities to influence the process of lawmaking, policy development processes, peace and reconciliation moves and other national decisions. For example, in March 2009 President Karzai signed the Shia Personal Status Law (SPSL) that was quietly making its way through Afghanistan’s parliamentary system. The law attracted the attention of international media when they found in it restrictions on the rights of Shia women. The media soon awakened the variety of stakeholders including civil society in Afghanistan and they reacted strongly to the law. Civil society activists, particularly the women’s network, brought over as allies some of the parliamentarians, they lobbied the President and lawmakers alongside conducting awareness-raising seminars, conferences and press debates and finally caused significant changes in the original draft law, which softened the restrictions on Shia women.[13] Civil society in Afghanistan has also contributed significantly to many other laws, the most prominent among them are the Civil Society Law, the Media Law, the law for Protection of Environment, the law for Higher Education and etc.
The Afghan government has launched a reconciliation process to find a mechanism for negotiating with insurgents in an effort to bring peace to Afghanistan. A High Council of Peace has been constituted that includes notables from the political and social arena of Afghanistan. Afghan civil society has direct and indirect membership of the High Council of Peace, however the bulk majority of Afghan civil has criticised this process because of the composition of the Council. Civil society activists lobbied government authorities in the beginning of the peace process not to include former commanders and instead make sure those as members of the council who have experience in peace rather than war.[14].At the moment, there is considerable skepticism among civil society actors about the possibilities for success of ongoing peace process: many consider it symbolic and instead merely a money-making opportunity for its members who are receiving high salaries from the large amount of funds the international community has allocated in this regard.[15] In addition, civil society networks are planning a joint conference during March 2011 with the Government of Afghanistan to share their concerns on the peace process and to adopt a unanimous stance.[16]
Although the influence of civil society on policies and programmes in Afghanistan has not been obvious because such policies in this aid-dependent and war-stricken country are highly politicized and militarilized given the country’s specific conditions, civil society has always ensured their representation and presence in the processes. During the time of the formulation of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the Government of Afghanistan consulted with civil society on different occasions and at different levels about national priorities and programmes. The same is happening in the current round of policymaking aiming to reprioritize ANDS and the development of National Priority Programmes (NPP). The current policymaking round is called the Kabul Process.
For the Kabul Process, civil society Afghanistan has adopted a proper strategy to deal with the issue of fragmentation and aims to respond jointly to the government on the NPP. After the London Conference (2010) civil society brought coordination to another level. For that conference, Afghan civil society started to unite their advocacy efforts and was able to get a seat on the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Body (JCMB) and at the three standing committees of the government. Currently both the private sector and academia each get a seat each at the same forums; these have both been used with more commitment and attention to content than the seat allocated to civil society.[17]
For the Kabul Process, Afghan civil society has taken the opportunity to reinforce their position by creating an internal civil society consultation mechanism. This mechanism will serve for policy consultation and joint advocacy efforts dealing with the Afghan government, donors and other international fora.[18]
Afghan Civil Society sees its engagement in the current round of policymaking in two layers : 1) Joint Coordination and Monitoring Body (JCMB), a forum of all the donors of Afghanistan and the Afghan Government cabinet members jointly headed by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the Government of Afghanistan and 2) the three Standing Committees on Development, Governance and Security. These standing committees are responsible for the different National Priority Programmes under them and report to the JCMB.
In order to coordinate activities and programmes for the JCMB and Standing Committees, each of the seven networks of civil society receives two seats but only one vote each. Moreover, in the board there are four observers, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) and the Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC). This board is responsible for the election of civil society representatives for both the JCMB and Standing Committee.[19] At that level only network members are allowed representation.[20] The networks which have hundreds of members each, are best in place to present a united civil society voice rather than individual organizations.
Different technical working groups of civil society organizations give to the representatives of civil society on the JCMB and Standing Committees technical recommendations to make their representation meaningful rather than representation just for the sake of representation.
Although the will of civil society is there to use this opportunity to influence policymaking, it is also running into difficulties. Firstly, in order to ensure the success of their consultative board, sufficient funding is required to appoint full-time staff who can coordinate the technical working groups and representatives of civil society for the JCMB and Standing Committees input. Secondly, civil society is running short of time, the deadlines for the completion of the Kabul Process is close and by the time Afghan civil society organizes its input mechanisms in an efficient way, the opportunity for influencing the policies and programmes would already have diminished. The third and most important aspect is that the influx of aid and demand for alternative service delivery channels has made most national NGOs engage in service delivery and they therefore do not have a strong background in advocacy or policy input. The majority of civil society representatives are generalists, rather than specialists in any specific sector, and so cannot always challenge the policies of government with strong arguments.
Conclusion:
Afghanistan is becoming democratized but slowly and it needs sufficient time for democratic principles to adjust to the country’s specific cultural and social context. Democracy cannot be imposed in a country like Afghanistan as a model for the post-conflict environment but it needs local interpretation in accordance with cultural and social values, where people understand it in principle rather than considering it to be unlimited freedom and the imposition of liberal values in an Islamic state.
Strong civil society is a critical condition for a democratic society, civil society could be strengthened and made efficient in Afghanistan if donors supported the local agendas and allowed the local actors to find out solutions according to the local priorities and experiences. The strengthening of civil society should be taken as a process and the donors should have long term commitment for their support.
Note: This article was written in March 2011 and read out in an International Conference in Kolkata on "Dynamics of Political Changes in India's Neighbourhood".
[1] http://www.8am.af/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17746:1389-12-09-04-35-49&catid=1:title&Itemid=553 (accessed on 1st March 2011).
[2] Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, “Undermining Representative Governance: Afghanistan’s 2010 Parliamentary Election and its Alienating Impact”, February 2011 (p 3)
[3] Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, “Undermining Representative Governance: Afghanistan’s 2010 Parliamentary Election and its Alienating Impact”,”, February 2011 available at www.areu.org.af
[4] Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, “Undermining Representative Governance: Afghanistan’s 2010 Parliamentary Election and its Alienating Impact”,”, February 2011 available at www.areu.org.af
[5] Anna Larson, “Toward an Afghan Democracy? Exploring Perceptions of Democratisation in Afghanistan”, September 2009, (p 1)
[6] Anna Larson, “Toward an Afghan Democracy? Exploring Perceptions of Democratisation in Afghanistan”, September 2009, (p 27)
[7] This definition is conceived from personal communications with Director of ACSF and the Deputy Director of ACBAR in Kabul.
[8] Elizabeth Winter, “Civil Society Development in Afghanistan,” June 2010
[9] Personal communications with staff of different civil society organizations during the last week of February 2011.
[10] Elizabeth Winter, “Civil Society Development in Afghanistan”, June 2010.
[11] Personal communication during the last week of February 2011.
[12] Personal communication during the last week of February 2011.
[13] Lauryn Oates, “A Closer Look: The Policy and Lawmaking Process behind the Shiite Personal Status Law,” September 2009, available at www.areu.org.af
[14] Personal communication with head of a Civil Society Network in Kabul on 27 February 2011
[15] This information is based on personal communication with range of civil society actors in Kabul during the last week of February 2011.
[16] Personal communication with head of a Civil Society Network in Kabul on 27 February 2011
[17] Afghan Civil Society Coordination, Integrity Watch International, 05-02-2011
[18] Afghan Civil Society Coordination, Integrity Watch International, 05-02-2011 (p 2)
[19] Afghan Civil Society Coordination, Integrity Watch International, 05-02-2011 (p 2)
[20] There is a six months rotation
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