By Sayed Mohammad Shah
Another year, just like a dry leaf in fall, flew away from the branch of time and we left 2010 behind. The year embodied critical events and changes in political and social arenas that impacted the life of Afghans in particular and lots of other people around the globe in general. 2010 inherited from its passing years, the terrible incidents of bomb blasts, suicide attacks, military operations and civilian causalities while political uncertainty, decreasing trust among the builders of the broken state of Afghanistan and growing ethnic division was seen to be on the rise . It was a year of contradictions and playing blame games. The Government of Afghanistan and its international partners, particularly the United States of America, stood on different paths of a single junction to reach common goals. (are taking different paths to reach the same goal?)
The international partners of Afghan Government seem to have lost their trust in Government of Afghanistan as currently constituted, and consider it corrupt and incapable. On the other hand, the Afghan Government saw problems in the way internationals have dealt with Afghanistan. Following the report of Transparency International that declared Afghanistan the second most corrupt country in the world, the internationals in Afghanistan held the corrupt elements in the Afghan Government responsible for the failure to bring stability and development in the country. In reciprocation, the Afghan Government found the biggest corruption to be as a result of awarding contracts by the international donors to private companies and in the operations of Private Security firms that was tremendously contributing to destabilization.
When the Afghan Government disbanded the private security companies during 2010, this deepened the differences. On December 13, an opinion writer of Washington Post’s, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, provided a vivid account of a meeting between President Karzai, General David Patraeus and American Ambassador in Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry. “The American side was warning the president that a precipitate cancellation of contracts with overseas private-security firms would leave many crucial targets unguarded. Karzai's response, before storming out of the room, was to shout that he now had three main enemies: the Taliban, the United States, and the international community, and that, "If I had to choose sides today, I'd join the Taliban".”
The problem is not only the allegations of corruption and disbandment of private security companies but it is also the way the Karzai Government and United States and its allies look at the issue of terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan. According to Ahmad Rashid in his article for The Spectator on 8th December, “Karzai seems to have given up on the ability of the Americans, the Brits and Nato either to defeat the Taliban or even to talk to them. This is why he turned to Pakistan and Iran: his own freelance attempt to try to broker a ceasefire with the Taliban which would involve a power sharing deal.” On the other hand, Americans do not like increasing role for Pakistan in dealing the issues of terrorism at least in Afghanistan.
Americans are aware that Pakistan’s ISI has great deal of influence and control on the Taliban leaders who are also staying in Pakistan and that Pakistan would make sure that such deal advances in their own national security interests. This is an American perception, which President Karzai does not like anymore. In his meeting with Parliamentarians on 1st April 2010, President Karzai lashed out at his Western backers, accusing the United States of interfering in Afghan affairs and saying the Taliban insurgency would become a legitimate resistance movement if the meddling does not stop[1]. Karzai has also openly said on Afghan media that internationals are pursuing covert objectives in Afghanistan and they did not come to fix the state.
Americans believe in bringing the Taliban to their knees before negotiating with them. Currently great military might is being used to achieve this objective. The military surge and increased operations made 2010 the bloodiest year for Afghan and International forces in Afghanistan. According to a report of Radio Azadi, over 700 international military personnel lost their life in 2010 while the spokesman of Afghan Ministry of Defence in an interview with Afghan media termed the casualties of Afghan military as high time in 2010. Meaning ? How many killed?
In the meantime, International military and Afghan Ministry of Defence also claim a great breakthrough in cracking down on insurgents and terrorists. General Zahir Azimi, the spokesman of Ministry of Defence in an exclusive interview with Radio Azadi said: “key leaders and influential insurgent leaders have been killed in the military operations”. These operations do not happen without civilian casualties, which are not reported. The extraordinary raw intelligence leaks from the Afghan battlefield confirmed that civilians are being killed in much larger numbers than officially admitted by NATO. The increasing civilian casualties are another big issue that is widening the distance between Afghan Government and its international partners. These figures should be available from UNAMA
President Karzai’s attempts to broker a ceasefire with the Taliban which would involve a power sharing deal, have also caused some divisions in Afghanistan and made the non Pashtun ethnicities severely worried about their future in the social and political arenas. These increasing worries are resulting in a lack of confidence in the capability and policies of the current government to build an ethnically balanced and representative modern state where all can live with equal social status under democratic principles.
We can make ourselves happy with some figures of development in education, health and infrastructure however we cannot make these figures count on sustainable development without national cohesiveness, social integrity and a common vision, mutual trust on the intentions and belief in the joint capabilities, among the actors of state building in Afghanistan.
Note: This brief article was written for a symposium in Delhi, January 2011
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